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INTRODUCTION
Does a right to property exist under international law? The traditional answer to this
question is “no”―a right to property can only arise under the domestic law of a particular nation.
Yet the view that property rights are exclusively governed by national law is increasingly
obsolete. This Article develops the thesis that the evolution of international law has reached the
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point where a global right to property should be recognized, not merely as a moral principle but
rather as an entitlement which all nations must honor. 1
Transformative economic and political changes over the last three decades have laid the
foundation for establishing a universal right to property. With the end of the Cold War era,
China, Russia, and most other socialist states have transitioned to market economies, ending their
long-held ideological opposition to property rights. Developing nations have increasingly
realized that respecting property rights may both encourage needed foreign investment and help
their citizens escape from poverty. The protection of property rights has become an essential
component of the globalization of trade, as reflected in a series of international and bilateral
treaties. Finally, today two-thirds of all nations are parties to regional human rights treaties that
contain the right to property.
This Article explores three independent lines of analysis for recognizing a global right to
property that binds all nations, each based on a different source of international law. 2 First, the
near-universal ratification of anti-discrimination treaties which arguably recognize the right to
property may provide a basis for justifying the right under conventional law. Second, because
the domestic law of virtually every nation embraces the right to property, it should be recognized
as a general principle of law which has universal application. Finally, because almost all nations
recognize the right to property under domestic law and have expressed their belief that the right
also exists under international law, it should be viewed as customary law which all nations must
follow.
Section I of this Article explores the unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a treaty that would
have created a global right to property during the Cold War era and its aftermath. Section II
analyzes three bases for recognizing the global right today: (a) conventional law; (b) general
principles of law; and (c) customary law. Finally, Section III addresses the future implications
of recognizing the global right.
I. PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY
A. Natural Law Dents in the Westphalian Model
For centuries, scholars have debated whether the right to property is created by the state
or arises independently from it as a matter of natural law. 3 The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which
1

A number of scholars have analyzed the scope of the right to property that is contained in four regional human
rights treaties. See, e.g., ALI RIZA COBAN, PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2003); THEO R.G. VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY (2002). Because those
treaties do not bind all nations, they do not create a global right to property. See infra text accompanying notes 5962. This Article is the first scholarship to demonstrate that a general right to property exists under international law.
2
It has been suggested that a specialized treaty should be adopted in order to create a global right to property. See,
e.g., VAN BANNING, supra note 1, at 369; Edwin D. Williamson, U.S.-E.U. Understanding on Helms-Burton: A
Missed Opportunity to Fix International Law on Property Rights, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 304-12 (1999); cf.
Christopher K. Odinet, Towards a Convention for the International Sale of Real Property: Challenges,
Commonalities, and Possibilities, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 841 (2011) (arguing for a treaty covering real property
sales). While a treaty would be helpful in delineating the scope of the global right to property, this Article argues
that the right already exists, contrary to the position of these commentators.
3
See generally RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1951).
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ushered in the modern nation state system, signaled the victory of the positivistic approach.
Under this view, property rights exist only to the extent that they are recognized by the law of a
particular nation. 4
A fundamental precept of international law is that each nation has sovereignty over its
own territory. 5 The logical corollary of this view is that each nation has the right to adopt its
own laws regarding the occupancy and use of that territory by private actors, including laws
regulating property rights. As one authority summarized, “[a] state enjoys an exclusive right to
regulate matters pertaining to the ownership of property of every kind which may be said to
belong within its territory.” 6 Under this approach, sovereignty and property are inextricably
intertwined; property rights are created and defined by only national law. 7 Thus, international
law traditionally has no impact on property rights except in a few specialized situations. 8
Despite the predominance of positivism, the theory that a right to property arises from
natural law persisted. 9 Thus, John Locke proclaimed that “[t]he Law of Nature stands as an
Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others.” 10 Under this view, states were formed in
order to protect pre-existing natural rights, including the right to property. In a sense, this natural
law formulation may be viewed as an international right in that it superseded national law and
was viewed as a universal standard.
Inspired by Locke and other natural rights theorists, the 1776 Virginia Declaration of
Rights proclaimed that all men possessed certain “inherent rights” which, when they “enter into a
state of society, they cannot . . . deprive or divest their posterity,” including “the means of
acquiring and possessing property.” 11 Declarations adopted by several other American colonies
4

As Jeremy Bentham famously stated: “Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and
property ceases.” JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1975) (1802).
5
1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 458 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
“OPPENHEIM”].
6
1 CHARLES HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 650 (2d
rev. ed. 1947). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(1)(b) (1986) [hereinafter “RESTATEMENT”] (providing that a state has jurisdiction to “prescribe law with respect
to . . . the status of . . . interests in things[] present within its territory”); E.A. Harriman, The Right of Property in
International Law, 6 B.U. L. REV. 103, 104 (1926) (“It is a mere truism . . . to say that the legal right of property is a
matter of local law.”).
7
The concepts of sovereignty and property “are essentially analogous on account of the exclusiveness of enjoyment
and disposition which is in law the main formal characteristic of both private property and territorial sovereignty.”
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1927).
8
The principal situations where international law affected property rights involved (a) the expropriation of property
from foreign nationals and (b) the destruction of civilian property during wartime. Harriman, supra note 6, at 105.
See also L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from Sovereignty
in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263 (1997) (arguing that international law traditionally protected
property rights in three situations).
9
As Hugo Grotius explained: “Soon after the creation of the world, and a second time after the Flood, God
conferred upon the human race a general right over things of a lower nature . . . . In consequence, each man could at
once take whatever he wished for his own needs, and could consume whatever was capable of being consumed. The
enjoyment of this universal right then served the purpose of private ownership . . . .” 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE
BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 186 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625). This “introduction of
property ownership . . . preceded all civil law . . . .” Id. at 295.
10
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 358 (Peter Haslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
11
VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I (1776).
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followed the Virginia model, expressly endorsing the right to property as natural law. 12
Although the later Declaration of Independence referred to the “pursuit of happiness” as an
“unalienable right,” without specifically mentioning property, 13 it seems likely that Thomas
Jefferson intended this broader formulation to encompass the right to property. 14
In turn, these American declarations influenced the development of the 1789 Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in France. 15 Article 2 of the Declaration identified
“property” as one of four “natural and imprescriptable rights of man.” 16 The content of the right
was set forth in Article 17: “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be
deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and
then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.” 17
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The concept that a right to property should exist regardless of national law was reborn in
the wake of World War II as part of the modern human rights movement. 18 The culmination of
this effort was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”), 19 which
was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948. The use of the term “rights” in this context
has the potential to cause confusion, because the Universal Declaration was created as a
nonbinding instrument 20 that merely set forth aspirational goals, not legally-enforceable
obligations. The distinction that Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein draw between “legal rights”
and “moral rights” is helpful here. 21 Under their approach, the provisions of the Universal
Declaration would be seen as non-enforceable “moral rights.” Because its provisions are “not
backed by legal force . . . [they are] . . . toothless by definition[,]” imposing “moral duties on all
mankind, not legal obligations . . . .” 22

12

See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 165-66 (1998).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1976).
14
MAIER, supra note 12, at 134 (suggesting that Jefferson “meant to say more economically and movingly” what
George Mason, the principal drafter of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, “stated with some awkwardness and at
considerably greater length”).
15
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (Fr. 1789) [hereinafter “1789 Declaration”].
16
Id. art. 2. See also DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN arts. 2, 16, 18, and 19 (Fr. 1793)
(discussing the scope of the right to property in detail).
17
1789 Declaration, supra note 15, at art. 17.
18
I briefly addressed the subject matter of Sections IB, IC, and ID in John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of
International Property Law, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 461, 465-68 (2012). The present Article analyzes this material in
greater depth to provide the necessary foundation for Sections II and III.
19
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter “Universal Declaration”]. The Universal Declaration was based on an initial draft that “contained the
first-generation political and civil rights found in British, French, and American revolutionary declarations of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: protections of life, liberty, and property . . . .” OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 31 (2010).
20
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 4 (Mashood A. Baderin &
Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds. 2010) [hereinafter “SIX DECADES”].
21
STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXATION 16-17
(1999).
22
Id. at 17.
13
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Article 17 of the Declaration acknowledged the right to property as a moral right. 23 It
provided: “(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others[]” and “(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” The first clause
recognized the right to property in general terms. 24 The second clause partially defined the
content of that right by limiting the ability of any nation to interfere with private property. While
a nation could deprive a person of his property, it could not do so in an arbitrary manner. This
restriction echoes the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
When the Universal Declaration was adopted, it was widely viewed as a preliminary step
toward a binding treaty that would transform its moral rights into legal rights. 25 The U.N.
Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) later undertook two efforts to convert the right to
property in the Universal Declaration into a binding obligation: (1) during negotiations leading
up to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”); 26
and (2) during a study of the issue between 1986 and 1993. Both were unsuccessful.
C. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
During the 1950s and 1960s, drafting committees working under the aegis of the
Commission negotiated two treaties to implement the Universal Declaration: the ICESCR 27 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 28 But when these twin treaties were
eventually adopted in 1966, neither contained a right to property. 29 The principal roadblocks that
led to this outcome stemmed from two sources: Cold War tensions and decolonization.
First, the Soviet Union and its allies objected to the creation of a global right to property
as a matter of ideology. 30 The most intense negotiations occurred between 1951 and 1954, well
after the post-war détente between the Soviet bloc and the West had faded. In this atmosphere,
Soviet negotiators tended to view Western efforts to include the right to property in the draft
ICESCR as a threat to the integrity of the communist system. For example, fearing foreign
interference with its economic system, the Soviet Union suggested an amendment that would
23

The fact that the property provision of the Universal Declaration was located in its Article 17, just as the property
provision of the 1789 Declaration was located in its Section 17, is presumably homage, not a coincidence.
24
But see Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in Their Own Land: Cultural Land and Transnational Corporations:
Emergent International Rights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 372 (1998) (arguing that Article 17 does not
recognize a “right to property”).
25
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND
INTERPRETATION 15-20 (1999); SIX DECADES, supra note 20, at 11.
26
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 998 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
“ICESCR”].
27
Id.
28
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
29
However, one scholar notes that this omission “can hardly be construed as rejecting the existence in principle of a
human right to own property and not be arbitrarily deprived of it.” Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 21 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). It
is noteworthy that the ICESCR does contain provisions which relate to the right to property. Its Article 11(1)
recognizes the right of everyone to “an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate . .
. housing . . . .” ICESCR, supra note 26, at art.11(1). In addition, Article 15(1)(c) recognizes the “right of everyone .
. . [t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.” Id. at art. 15(1)(c).
30
VAN BANNING, supra note 1, at 44-45.
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define the scope of the “global” right to property by the law of the nation in which the property
existed―a position which would have eviscerated the international character of the right. 31
Ultimately, after the drafting committee was unable to reach agreement on the phrasing of the
right to property in 1954, the committee suspended its efforts on this point and moved on to
consider other topics. 32
Second, the decades following World War II brought widespread decolonization, as
former colonies became independent nations. This process was often accompanied by anticolonial rhetoric that called for the expropriation of property owned by citizens of the former
colonial powers. Under these conditions, new nations were often unwilling to agree to a global
right to property because it would constrain their ability to expropriate. 33 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 1803 34 illustrates this mindset. Adopted in 1963 over the objections of
most developed nations, it appeared to reject the pre-World War II consensus that a state which
expropriated property owned by a foreign national was obligated to pay compensation equal to
the fair market value of the property. Instead, the resolution provided that a state had the right to
expropriate such property in its national interest and was obligated to pay only “appropriate
consideration” as defined by both “the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the
exercise of its sovereignty” and by international law. 35 Motivated by this concern, many of these
new countries were reluctant to endorse an enforceable global right to property, either during the
1951-54 negotiations or thereafter.
D. The Valencia Rodriguez Report
Twenty years after the ICESCR was adopted, the question of a global right to property
arose again. In 1986, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution asking the Commission to
“consider the means whereby and the degree to which the right to own property . . . contributes
to the development of individual liberty and initiative . . . .” 36 The preamble to the resolution
expressed the conviction that “the right of everyone to own property alone, as well as in
association with others, as set forth in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, .
. . is of particular significance in fostering widespread enjoyment of other basic human rights . . .
.” 37 Four years later, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/98, which urged states “to
provide, where they have not done so, adequate constitutional and legal provisions to protect the
right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others and the right not to
be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property.” 38
31

U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Int’l Covenant on Human Rights & Measures for
Implementation: USSR―Amendment to the draft resolution of the United States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/614 (May 4,
1951).
32
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the 10th Session, Supp. 7, at 7-9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/705 (Apr. 1954).
33
See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 217 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that one reason the right to property was
omitted from the ICESCR was a lack of consensus on issues relating to expropriation); VAN BANNING, supra note 1,
at 47 (explaining that “newly independent states felt the need to establish and assert unequivocally their sovereignty
over natural resources” through expropriation of foreign property).
34
G. A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962).
35
Id. at art. 4.
36
G.A. Res. 41/132, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/132 (Dec. 4, 1986).
37
Id.
38
G.A. Res. 45/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98 (Dec. 14, 1990).

6

The Commission selected Luis Valencia Rodriguez, a Venezuelan scholar, to conduct an
investigation into the right to property. In his 1993 report, Valencia Rodriguez acknowledged
that “[t]he basic human right of the individual to own property and develop it to its full potential
may be regarded as a human right and a fundamental freedom.” 39 Yet he did not conclude that a
binding right to property existed even in this limited form. Rather, he observed that the right to
property had “acquired its mandatory legal character” only to the extent that it was included in
certain regional human rights conventions and other specialized treaties examined in the report. 40
Yet, because not all nations were parties to such agreements, he reasoned that it was not yet a
“universal right.” 41
In rejecting the concept of a universal right, Valencia Rodriguez noted that it would be
“extremely difficult” to establish a global right to property that would be (1) incorporated into
“the national law of all states” and (2) “capable of being given the same weight in domestic
courts.” 42 He also expressed concern that further consideration of the right to property by the
Commission might interfere with “the effective functioning of other areas of the human rights
system,” 43 especially due to the “considerable financial constraints” which affected the
Commission at that time. 44 Ultimately, he did not recommend that the Commission take
concrete steps to ensure that the right to property was honored at the international level, such as
by encouraging the adoption of a multilateral treaty on the subject. However, he did indicate
support for developing additional regional human rights conventions that would recognize the
right to property “similar to that established under the European Convention on Human Rights
and the First Protocol thereto.” 45 Under this approach, the costs of monitoring and enforcing the
right to property would presumably be borne by regional human rights entities, not by the
Commission or other U.N. bodies.
Underlying the Valencia Rodriguez study was the assumption that a binding right to
property did not exist under international law. Indeed, the point of his study was to ascertain
whether it would be feasible and desirable to recognize such a right in the future, presumably
through a multilateral treaty.
II. RECOGNIZING THE GLOBAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY

39
Independent Expert Report, The Right of Everyone to Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others
90, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993) (by Luis Valencia Rodriguez)
[hereinafter “Valencia Rodriguez report”].
40
Id. at 38.
41
Id. at 22.
42
Id. at 90. However, it is not clear why Valencia Rodriguez believed that an international right to property sould
be required to satisfy these stringent criteria. Most of the provisions of the ICESCR are not incorporated into
national laws, but are still considered to be international law. Similarly, while it might ultimately be desirable if the
global right to property were enforced in domestic courts, this level of enforcement is not essential to the existence
of the right. Recognition of the global right will ensure that it is respected in proceedings before international
judicial and arbitral tribunals and also employed in less formal methods of international dispute resolution, whether
or not it is also enforced in domestic courts. See infra text accompanying notes 191-93.
43
Id. at 93.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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A. Property in the Post-Cold War Era
The thesis of this Article is that a global right to property does exist, not simply as a
matter of abstract morality but rather as a binding obligation. The contrary conclusion in the
Valencia Rodriguez report may well have been accurate when it was reached in 1993, given
international conditions at that time and the limited scope of the study. But, even assuming this
arguendo, four factors compel re-examination of the question today.
First, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the development of new democracies, and the
accelerating globalization of trade, international attitudes toward property rights have shifted
dramatically. The revised constitutions of former Soviet bloc members generally guarantee that
their citizens have a right to property. 46 Indeed, their modern economic systems are largely
premised on the existence of private property. When the Valencia Rodriguez report was
prepared, this transformation was underway but not yet completed. 47
Second, as developing countries seek to both attract foreign investment and enhance their
domestic economies, they increasingly understand the value of protecting property rights. In
recent decades, over 2,400 bilateral investment treaties have been implemented between investor
nations and developing nations; 48 these treaties routinely include provisions which protect
against the expropriation of private property. 49 The rapid expansion of the World Trade
Organization―and particularly the enhanced protection of intellectual property rights embodied
in the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 50―reflect
heightened international support for the protection of property rights.
Third, the development of international law has accelerated since the Valencia Rodriguez
study was completed. For example, the report noted that the “degree of ratification and
accession to universal conventions containing [the right to property] does not allow us to state
that we are dealing with a universally recognized right.” 51 But, at the same time, it stressed that
“the level of recognition is steadily increasing, approaching universality.” 52 In the last two
decades, this trend has continued to the point where an argument can be made that the global
right to property exists as a matter of treaty law.
Finally, because the Valencia Rodriguez study was conducted under the auspices of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, it examined the right to property as a human rights issue.
Thus, while it discussed the extent to which such a right could be found in human rights treaties,

46

John G. Sprankling, The Right to Property in National Constitutions (Feb. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) [hereinafter “National Constitutions”].
47
The Valencia Rodriguez report acknowledged that this transformation was occurring. See, e.g., Valencia
Rodriguez report, supra note 39, at 21-22, 40-41.
48
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 554 (2d ed. 2008).
49
Id. at 584.
50
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
51
Valencia Rodriguez report, supra note 39, at 22.
52
Id.
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it did not explore whether the right could be viewed as a general principle of law or as customary
international law. 53
It is generally-accepted that Article 38(b) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice 54 sets forth the authoritative sources of international law. 55 They include: (1)
“international conventions” or treaties; (2) the “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations”; and (3) “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”56
Each of these sources potentially provides a separate basis for recognizing the global right to
property.
B. Treaties
Today the majority of the world’s nations are parties to regional human rights treaties
which contain a right to property. While this level of recognition is not yet universal, it must be
stressed that a principle of international law may exist without unanimous agreement. Indeed,
only a handful of international law doctrines enjoy universal acceptance. This section first
evaluates the extent to which the human rights treaties endorse the right to property. Because
many nations are not parties to such a treaty, it then considers whether the right to property is
implicit in anti-discrimination treaties that have been ratified by virtually all nations.
1. Human Rights Treaties
It is remarkable that 132 nations―more than two-thirds of the 193 member states of the
United Nations―are now parties to human rights treaties which expressly recognize a right to
property. 57 These treaties are the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
53

The only reference to general principles of law in the Valencia Rodriguez report is found in the section on
expropriation; it concludes that the obligation to pay compensation when a state takes property owned by a foreign
national is required by “general principles of international law.” Id. at 75. Although the report states vaguely that
the Universal Declaration set forth “universal standards which became rules of customary international law,” it does
not identify which standards became customary law or state that the right to property was included in this group.
Id. at 38. Indeed, two paragraphs later the report states that the right to property “acquired its mandatory legal
character” only to the extent that it was “included in treaties analyzed above.” Id. Thus, the report does not appear
to claim that the right to property is customary international law.
54
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(b).
55
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (7th ed. 2008); OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 2425.
56
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(b).
57
This tabulation is based on the following. Fifty-three nations have ratified the African Charter. African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ratification Table, available at
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). Twenty-three nations have ratified
the American Convention on Human Rights. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_BRights,
Signatories
and
Ratifications,
available
at
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). Eleven nations have ratified
the Arab Charter. Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights: Classification and
Status of Ratifications, 32 HUM. RTS. L.J. 197, 200 (2012). Forty-five nations have ratified the First Protocol to the
European Convention. Council of Europe, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental
Freedoms,
Status,
available
at
http://www.conventions.coe/int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=009&CM=8&DF=28/02/2013&CL=ENG
(last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
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Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”), 58 the American Convention on Human Rights
(“American Convention”), 59 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African
Charter”), 60 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights (“Arab Charter”). 61 Thus, a right to property
is a reality in most of the world based on conventional law. 62
Despite contentious negotiations, the right to property was initially omitted from the
European Convention when it was adopted in 1950. 63 In part, this omission reflected economic
concerns; some Western European states anticipated that the nationalization of key industries
such as banks, railways, and utilities might be desirable. 64 Another factor was the political
tension resulting from Soviet influence over Eastern European states. 65 The right to property
was later added to the European Convention as Article 1 of Protocol 1.66 It provides, in part, that
“[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”67
Although the term “possessions” might be viewed as a narrower category than “property,” the
European Court of Human Rights has subsequently interpreted this article as protecting all types
of property. 68
Over the last three decades, the movement toward recognizing property as a human right
has gained momentum. In succession, the right was enshrined in the American Convention
which entered into force in 1978 and in the African Charter which took effect in 1986. The
American Convention expressed the basic right in clear language: “Everyone has the right to the
use and enjoyment of his property.” 69 The formulation adopted in the African Charter was
equally straightforward: “The right to property shall be guaranteed.” 70 Finally, the Arab

58

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, protocol 1, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213
U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter “Protocol 1”].
59
American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter “American
Convention”].
60
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter “African
Charter”].
61
Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 25, Sept. 15, 1994, reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005)
[hereinafter “Arab Charter”].
62
In addition, ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have (a) adopted a non-binding
declaration which recognizes the right to property and (b) announced their intention to enter into a binding treaty
which will include this right. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73. It should noted that ten other nations, while
not parties to any of the regional human rights conventions, are signatories to the non-binding Charter of Paris for a
New Europe, which affirms that “every individual has the right . . . to own property alone or in association . . . .”
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 193, 194. They are: Belarus, Canada, Kazakhstan,
Kyrtyzstan, Macedonia, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United States, and Uzbekistan. Id. Thus, in
addition to the 132 nations that are currently members to a binding treaty recognizing the right to property, an
additional twenty nations are parties to non-binding regional instruments that recognize the right.
63
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter “European Convention”].
64
VAN BANNING, supra note 1, at 64.
65
Id.
66
Protocol 1, supra note 58.
67
Id.
68
See, e.g., Marckx v. Belgium [1979] Eur. Ct. H.R. 6833/74 at ¶ 63 (observing that “Article 1 is in substance
guaranteeing the right to property”).
69
American Convention, supra note 59, at art. 21(1).
70
African Charter, supra note 60, at art. 14.
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Charter, which entered into force in 2008, provides in part: “Everyone has a guaranteed right to
own private property . . . .” 71
Most recently, the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 72 a nonbinding instrument that recognizes the
right to property. Its Article 17 echoes the right to property set forth in the Universal
Declaration: “Every person has the right to own, use, dispose of and give that person’s lawfully
acquired possessions alone or in association with others. No person shall be arbitrarily deprived
of such property.” 73 The ASEAN nations intend to develop a binding treaty that will guarantee
the rights in this declaration, including the right to property.
In short, there is a clear trend toward including a global right to property in regional
human rights treaties. It is reasonable to assume that this momentum will continue in coming
decades, as more nations become members of such treaties.
It is logical at this point to consider whether characterizing the right to property as a
“human right” rather than simply as a “right” significantly affects its nature or content. At one
level, framing the right as a human right suggests that it is fundamental in nature. As the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States explains, the term
“human rights refers to freedoms, immunities, and benefits which, according to widely accepted
contemporary values, every human being should enjoy in the society in which he or she lives.”74
The implication of this view is that human rights “occupy a hierarchical superior position among
the norms of international law,” 75 and thereby prevail over other norms. This approach applies
neatly to human rights which are recognized as jus cogens, such as the absolute right to be free
from genocide or torture. But it must be questioned whether this characterization applies as
readily to socio-economic norms, such as the right to property, which are by definition relative in
nature. 76
A related issue is whether the protection afforded by a human right to property applies
only to natural persons or whether it extends as well to legal persons such as corporations and
other entities. One component of the basic definition of a “human right” is that it is a right held
by a human being, not by an entity. For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration suggests
that the instrument applies only to “human beings.” 77 The scope of the nonbinding right to
property established in Article 17, then, would seem only to protect natural persons. However,
most of the regional human rights treaties cover legal persons as well as natural persons. 78 In
71

Arab Charter, supra note 61, at art. 31.
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Nov. 18, 2012, reprinted in 32 HUM. RTS. L.J. 219 (2012).
73
Id. at art. 17.
74
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 701 cmt. a.
75
DE SCHUTTER, supra note 19, at 60.
76
See infra text accompanying notes 181-84. But see The Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 140, 141 (Mar. 29, 2006) (suggesting that the right to property
held by indigenous people supersedes a bilateral investment treaty).
77
Universal Declaration, supra note 19, at art. 1.
78
See European Convention, supra note 63, at art. 25; American Convention, supra note 59, at art. 44; African
Charter, supra note 60, at art. 55. However, the Arab Charter is not clear on this question. Its Article 25 guarantees
the right to property of “every citizen,” which seemingly would include both individuals and entities. Arab Charter,
supra note 61, at art. 25. On the other hand, its Article 2 undertakes to ensure that each “individual” is able to
72
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addition, the right recognized by these treaties appears to extend to all forms of property,
including family or household property and income-generating property such as businesses,
farms and industrial facilities―not simply to the type of property which an individual would use
in daily life. 79 Accordingly, the right to property as recognized by the human rights treaties has a
broad scope.
2. Anti-Discrimination Treaties
Because many nations are not parties to the regional human rights treaties, these treaties
are insufficient to establish a global right to property as conventional law. Thus, it is important
to determine whether the right to property is included in other treaties which they have ratified.
One argument is that the global right to property is implicit in certain treaties which prohibit
discrimination against vulnerable groups―treaties that have been ratified by almost all nations of
the world. Under this view, each of these treaties inherently assumes that the right to property
exists under international law, but that discrimination at the national level prevents the particular
group from enjoying this right on an equal basis with other citizens. Thus, it is necessary to
redress this imbalance by prohibiting discrimination so that the underlying global right to
property can be realized.
For example, 187 nations 80―ninety-seven percent of the world’s countries―are parties
to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”). 81 Its Article 16 requires member states to “ensure, on a basis of equality of men
and women: . . . (h) [t]he same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or
for a valuable consideration.” 82

“enjoy the rights and freedoms” specified in the Charter without discrimination; this may imply that only natural
persons are entitled to protection. Id. at art. 2.
79
The American Convention and the African Charter both protect the right to “property” as a general matter,
without imposing any limitations on the nature of the property protected. American Convention, supra note 59, at
art. 21(1); African Charter, supra note 60, at art. 14. See also Mouvement Ivoirien de Droits de
l”Homme/Cote’d’Ivoire, Af. Comm’n H.P. Rts. 262/02 (May 2008) (holding that the seizure of rural land owned by
40 companies violated the right to property in African Charter). The Arab Charter guarantees the right to “private
ownership,” again without any limitations on the type of property protected. Arab Charter, supra note 61, at art. 25.
Finally, the reference to protection of “possessions” in the European Convention extends to all forms of property.
Protocol 1, supra note 58; COBAN, supra note 1, at 144-162 (analyzing decisions by the European Court of Human
Rights interpreting the right to property). In contrast, the first regional human rights instrument, the 1948 American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, covered only such property as was needed “for decent living and
help[ed] to maintain the dignity of the individual and the home.” American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man art. XXIII, O.A.S. Res. XXX (May 2, 1948).
80
U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN,
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
81
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter “CEDAW”].
82
Id. at art. 16(1)(h).
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Similarly, the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“CERD”), 83 ratified by 175 nations, 84 obligates member states “to guarantee the
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality
before the law, notably in the exercise of the following rights: . . . (v) [t]he right to own property
alone as well as in association with others.” 85
The right to property is also recognized in the 1990 International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (“CPRMW”),86
which has been ratified by forty-six nations. 87 It provides that “[n]o migrant worker or member
of his or her family shall be arbitrarily deprived of property, whether owned individually or in
association with others.” 88
Most recently, the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(“CRPD”), 89 ratified by 127 nations, 90 requires member states to “take all appropriate and
effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property
. . . .” 91
The implied recognition argument posits that CEDAW, CERD, CPRMW, and CRPD
presuppose the existence of an underlying international right to property which is enjoyed
generally by most people, but that discrimination sometimes prevents women, racial minorities,
migrant workers, and disabled persons from fully exercising this right. As the argument goes,
these treaties do not create a global right to property, but rather implicitly acknowledge that such
a right exists as a matter of background law. By prohibiting discrimination against vulnerable
groups, the treaties allow everyone to fully enjoy this fundamental right on equal terms.
Support for the position that these treaties impliedly recognize the global right to property
is found in resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly. One example is Resolution
41/132, adopted in 1986, which invited the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to “resume
consideration of the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with
others.” 92 The preamble to the resolution states that “the right of everyone to own property alone
83

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, May 7, 1996, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter “CERD”].
84
U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CERD, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013).
85
Id. at art. 5(v).
86
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,
Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CPRMW”].
87
U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CPRMW, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013).
88
Id. at art. 15.
89
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, May 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CRPD”].
90
U.N. Treaty Database, CRPD, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013).
91
CRPD, supra note 89, at art. 12(5).
92
G.A. Res. 41/132 ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/132 (Dec. 4, 1986).
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as well as in association with others,” as set forth in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration, was
“reaffirmed” by Article 16 of CEDAW. This language seemingly acknowledges that the
nonbinding right to property in the Universal Declaration was incorporated into CEDAW, a
binding treaty, and thus imposes an obligation on all 187 member nations to respect that right. It
is a well-settled principle that a subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of a treaty may be taken into account in determining its meaning. 93 Because
Resolution 41/132 was approved by a vote of 109 nations to none, it might be viewed a
subsequent agreement which interprets the meaning of CEDAW. 94 Four years later, Resolution
45/98 struck the same theme, repeating that the right to property contained in Article 17 was
“reaffirmed” by CEDAW. 95
In his 1993 report, Valencia Rodriquez implied that the global right to property was
“incorporated in universal instruments” such as CEDAW, CERD, and CPRMW. 96 Yet the report
concluded that the degree of ratification of such treaties at that time did not justify treating the
right to property as a “universal right.” 97 Today, twenty years later, the degree of ratification is
substantially higher. As noted above, 187 members of the United Nations have ratified
CEDAW―every member except Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tonga, and the
United States. However, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Tonga, and the United States have ratified
CERD, 98 which also protects the right to property. Only two U.N. member states―Palau and the
newly independent nation of South Sudan―are not parties to a treaty which arguably
incorporates the global right to property. Thus, if the implied recognition approach is justifiable,
it is fair to say that today the right to property is almost universally recognized in conventional
law.
But there are several bases for questioning this approach. First, no provision in these
treaties expressly recognizes a general right to property. Consistent with the principle that a
treaty is to be interpreted “in the light of its object and purpose,” 99 the dominant theme in CERD,
CEDAW, and CRPD may simply be to protect vulnerable groups against discrimination in the
exercise of rights that already exist under domestic law, not to impose new rights which a nation
does not recognize. Under this interpretation, for example, if Nation A prohibited private
property altogether, this law would not discriminate against the vulnerable groups protected by
these treaties because the nation would be according the same treatment to all of its nationals.
Thus, an argument can be made that the property-related clauses in the treaties simply mean that
(a) if a state chooses to allow property rights as a matter of domestic law, then (b) it may not
discriminate against members of these protected groups in their enjoyment of those rights. In
contrast, the phrasing of the property provision in the CPRMW seems to guarantee that migrant
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(a), May 23, 1965, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “Vienna
Convention”].
94
U.N. BIBLIO. INFO. SYST., A/RES/41/132, available at
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=HB6251K582145.481285&menu=search (last visited Mar. 1,
2013).
95
G.A. Res. 45/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98 (Dec. 14, 1990).
96
Valencia Rodriquez report, supra note 39, at 13, 14, 22.
97
Id.
98
See U.N. TREATY DATABASE, CERD, supra note 84.
99
Vienna Convention, supra note 93, at art. 31(1).
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workers and their families have a right to property under international law, regardless of
domestic law. Yet CPRMW has not been widely ratified.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of these treaties also undercut the
implied recognition approach. When the meaning of a treaty is “ambiguous or obscure,”
supplementary means such as the “circumstances of its conclusion” may be considered to help
determine its meaning. 100 CERD and CEDAW were adopted in 1966 and 1979, respectively,
years before the collapse of the Soviet bloc. During this era the Soviet Union and its allies
generally continued to oppose private property rights for ideological reasons. It is difficult to
believe that these nations would have ratified these treaties if any reasonable argument could
have been made that they were thereby acknowledging the existence of a global right to property.
Even as late as 1986, forty-one nations abstained from voting on General Assembly Resolution
41/132, which endorsed the view that CEDAW “reaffirmed” the right to property in the
Universal Declaration. 101 Yet the adoption of CRPD in 2006―long after the disintegration of
the Soviet bloc―appears to counterbalance this point, and thus support the implied recognition
theory. It is significant that CRPD has been ratified by China (2008), Cuba (2007), Russia
(2012), and twenty nations which were formerly part of the Soviet bloc (2007-12). 102
A final challenge is that the relevant General Assembly resolutions may be viewed as
internally inconsistent as to whether the global right to property exists. As noted above, the text
of Resolutions 41/132 and 45/98 stated that CEDAW “reaffirms” the right to property in Article
17 of the Universal Declaration, which supports the implied recognition theory. However,
Resolution 45/98 simultaneously urges all nations to “provide, where they have not done so,
adequate constitutional and legal provisions to protect the right of everyone to own property
alone as well as in association with others and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s
property.” 103 Similarly, Resolution 43/124 calls on states to ensure that “their national
legislation with regard to all forms of property shall preclude any impairment of the enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .” 104 These provisions might be read either as
suggesting that (a) domestic legislation is required to create a right to property because the right
is not recognized by international law or (b) domestic legislation is an appropriate method to
implement the right to property which is recognized by international law.
3. Conclusion
Conventional law provides limited support for the existence of a global right to property.
Although the right to property is expressly recognized in the regional human rights treaties,
about one-third of the world’s nations have not ratified them. An argument can be made that the
global right to property is implied in anti-discrimination conventions which have been ratified by
100

Id. at art. 32(a).
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USSR, Vietnam, and nine Eastern European nations in the Soviet bloc.
102
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virtually every nation. But, at a minimum, the strength of the implied recognition argument is
unclear. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider whether the global right to property can be
established through either general principles of law or customary law, both sources of
international law which bind all nations.
C. General Principles of Law
The right to property as a general matter is almost universally protected by national law.
Ninety-five percent of the 193 states which are members of the United Nations guarantee the
right to property, 105 most commonly by language embedded in the national constitution. 106 The
right is typically contained in the section of the constitution which sets forth the “basic rights,”
“fundamental rights,” or “human rights” which are recognized by that nation. The nearunanimous recognition of the right to property qualifies it as a general principle of law at the
international level which will bind all nations―including the few that do not recognize a
domestic right to property. 107 This approach would extend the global right to nations which are
not parties to regional human right treaties, avoiding the need to rely on the implied recognition
theory. However, perhaps because international tribunals have been cautious about utilizing
general principles, to date there has been no scholarly analysis about using this approach to
establish a global right to property. 108
1. General Principles as a Source of International Law
It is uniformly accepted that the “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations” are a source of international law. 109 As one scholar notes, “[t]he legal principles which
105

The precise scope of the right to property will presumably vary from to nation to nation, both in terms of the
content of the right and the items which are subject to the right. The point is that these nations do recognize the
right to property as a general matter.
106
National Constitutions, supra note 46. Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe are the principal
exceptions. The constitutions of Cuba and North Korea contain only narrow rights to property. The Cuban
constitution protects personal savings from work, dwellings, other “goods and objects which serve to satisfy the
material and cultural needs of the person,” and ownership of land by small farmers. CONST. OF CUBA art. 19, 21.
Similarly, the North Korean constitution covers property used “for the personal and consumption purposes of
citizens,” which includes income from “garden plot farming . . . [and] other legal economic activities.” CONST. OF
NORTH KOREA art. 24. In contrast, the constitutions of Venezuela and Zimbabwe both contain a broad right to
property, but substantially undercut that right by allowing the expropriation of property with little or no
compensation under certain circumstances. CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 115, 116; CONST. OF ZIMBABWE art. 71, 72.
See also A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) (analyzing
property clauses from eighty-five national constitutions).
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Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 701 n. 1 (noting “a willingness to conclude that prohibitions [on
interference with human rights] common to the constitutions or laws of many states are general principles that have
been absorbed into international law”).
108
But see Brice M. Claggett, The Controversy Over Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: Who Is Breaking
International Law―The United States or the States that Have Made Themselves Co-conspirators with Cuba in its
Unlawful Confiscations?, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 271, 289 (1997) (suggesting that it “may be possible
to conclude that the duty of a state not to confiscate its citizens’ property without just compensation” is a general
principle); Natalie Hevener & Steven Mosher, General Principles of Law and the U.N. Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 596, 609, 612 (1978) (arguing that Article 17(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights codifies the general principle of the right to inviolability of the home).
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The modern view is that a “civilized nation” in this context simply refers to a state with a well-developed legal
system. All nations that are members of the United Nations are presumed to be “civilized” nations. M. Cherif
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find a place in all or most of the various national systems of law naturally commend themselves
to states for application in the international legal system, as being almost necessarily inherent in
any system within the experience of states.” 110 These principles may be established through
comparative law research. The goal is to identify a core principle which is shared by the “major
legal systems of the world,” even if it is not necessarily utilized by every nation. 111 Once
established, a general principle of law is binding on all nations.
Despite the predictions of some scholars that general principles of law would
substantially expand the corpus of international law, 112 tribunals have generally been reluctant to
use them. 113 Thus, it is appropriate to consider whether the reasons for this reluctance apply to
the right to property.
One explanation for the limited use of general principles is that international law
traditionally regulated only interactions among state actors, where principles of domestic law had
little relevance. 114 Yet the scope of international disputes has expanded in recent decades to new
subject areas where little or no international law exists, often involving the relationship between
a state actor and a private actor. 115 It has become necessary to utilize new sources of law in
order to accommodate this expansion. 116 Accordingly, for example, arbitral tribunals have
increasingly utilized general principles derived from domestic contract law in resolving
investment disputes. 117
Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law,” 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 768
(1990).
110
OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 36.
111
Wolfgang Friedman, The Uses of “General Principles” in the Development of Modern International Law, 57
AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 284 (1963); see also H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 65 (2d ed. 1946) (noting that the
principle must be “recognized in substance by all the main systems of law”); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 535 (1993) (noting that the principle must be shared by “the principal
domestic legal systems”).
112
See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 111, at 279 (noting that “[i]t is to the general principles of law . . . that we must
increasingly turn for the building and evolution of new branches of international law, such as international
administrative law, international criminal law, or international contract law”).
113
1 RUDOLPH SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 8
(1968) (finding “virtual unanimity” among scholars that general principles have not “been a truly significant factor
in the jurisprudence of international courts”); BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 17 (noting that the International Court of
Justice has used general principles “sparingly”).
114
See Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law―Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the
New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (1999).
115
See, e.g., Lord McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 3 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1,
1-4 (1957) (discussing the need for new principles to govern investment disputes between states and private
investors).
116
Thus, “reliance on general principles of law has played an important part in the provision of legal rules in those
areas which . . . do not fall within the traditional scope of international law, such as . . . transactions of states
(particularly in their dealings with private corporations) on essentially private law matters.” OPPENHEIM, supra note
5, at 39. See also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49 (1991) (noting that
general principles of law “have been significant in allowing international law to expand into new areas of interstate
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See, e.g., John R. Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Experience, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 278 (1989) (discussing the use of general principles of contract law in resolving
claims before the tribunal); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at part III intro. note (observing that the
“international law of international agreements, indeed, is derived from general principles common to the contract
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A second objection is that the use of general principles is inconsistent with the axiom that
the international system is premised on state consent. 118 Yet general principles, by definition,
reflect core legal concepts which are shared by the major legal systems of the world; individual
nations have effectively consented to these principles by adopting them into their domestic laws.
Thus, the use of such principles cannot cause surprise or inequity, particularly in a dispute which
falls outside of the traditional areas of international law, such as a property dispute between a
nation and a foreign corporation.
A third concern is that allowing judges to rely on general principles would permit them to
exercise subjective judgment unconstrained by the relatively clear limits of conventional and
customary international law, thus becoming “a mere mask for capricious law-making by judicial
fiat.” 119 At bottom, this concern is about methodology. Admittedly, tribunals which use general
principles sometimes appear to assume that a particular concept is found in the domestic law of
most or all nations, with little or no analysis of comparative law. 120 But this potential problem
has no application to the right to property which is almost universally recognized in domestic
law, as discussed above. 121
Finally, there is widespread scholarly disagreement about how specific a general
principle of law may be. Most authorities agree that general principles connote fundamental
concepts, rather than technical rules. Thus, Hersch Lauterpacht viewed them as “obvious
maxims of jurisprudence of a general and fundamental character,” 122 while Bin Cheng
characterized them as “cardinal principles of the legal system.” 123 Yet other scholars suggest
that even a narrow rule could be viewed as a general principle of law. 124 Because this Article
advocates the recognition of the right to property in broad terms, there is no danger that it would
create a general principle which is unduly specific.
2. The Right to Property in Domestic Law
While the precise formulation of the right varies somewhat, almost every nation
guarantees the right of natural and legal persons to own property as a general matter, without any

laws of state legal systems . . . .”); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at viii (noting that general principles of law used in
international arbitration “are for the most part identical with generally recognized principles of private law”).
118
Bassiouni, supra note 109, at 785-86.
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SCHLESINGER, supra note 113, at 11; see also Bassiouni, supra note 109, at 779.
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See, e.g., Crook, supra note 117.
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See National Constitutions, supra note 46.
122
1 INTERNATIONAL LAW BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 69, 74 (E. Lauterpacht ed.,
1970).
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The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 38 GROTIUS
SOCIETY TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1952 125, 132 (1953) (discussion of Bin Cheng).
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SCHLESINGER, supra note 113, at 8 (suggesting that a general principle of law could be “broad or narrow”); F.A.
Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 20, 36 (1957) (observing that a general
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limitation on the nature of that property. 125 Many of these provisions echo Article 17(1) of the
Universal Declaration, even if phrased differently. 126 Sample clauses include:
Angola: Everyone shall be guaranteed the right to private property and its
transmission under the terms of the Constitution and the law. The state shall
respect the property and any other rights in rem of private individuals, corporate
bodies and local communities . . . . 127
Argentina: All inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to the following rights: . . . to
make, use and dispose of their property . . . . Property may not be violated and no
inhabitant of the Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a sentence based
on law . . . . 128
Azerbaijan: Everyone has the right to own property. No type of property shall be
granted superiority. Ownership rights, including the rights for private owners, are
protected by law. 129
Most of these provisions go well beyond merely recognizing the right as an abstract matter and
specifically address one or more of the following topics: (1) the content of the right; (2)
limitations on the state’s ability to regulate property; and (3) limitations on the state’s ability to
deprive citizens of property. 130
It is instructive to compare the overwhelming acceptance of the right to property today
with the situation which Valencia Rodriquez described in his report two decades ago. Rather
than conducting independent research, he relied on states to voluntarily submit information on
the extent to which they recognized a right to property. Many states did not respond to the
request for information, and diplomatic concerns presumably limited the scope of further inquiry.
As a result, the report identified only thirty-five nations where “the basic laws and other
legislation...recognize[] the right to own property as both a legal institution and a basic right.” 131
From this information and other sources he was able to conclude that “the majority of states have
declared their commitment to the principle of full recognition and protection of all forms of
property, including private property.” 132
Yet today national recognition of the right to property has moved from a majority view to
an almost universal norm. The key to understanding this shift concerns the forty-one nations
which abstained from voting for General Assembly Resolution 41/132 in 1986 133―primarily
125

See National Constitutions, supra note 46.
See, e.g., CONST. OF MALAWI art. 28 (“(1) Every person shall be able to acquire property alone or in association
with others. (2) No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of property.”).
127
CONST. OF ANGOLA art. 37.
128
CONSTITUTION NACIONAL [Const. Nac.] art. 14 (Arg.).
129
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN art. 29.
130
See National Constitutions, supra note 46; see also VAN DER WALT, supra note 106 (analyzing property clauses
from various national constitutions).
131
Valencia Rodriguez report, supra note 39, at 17.
132
Id at 90.
133
U.N. BIBLIO. INFO. SYST., supra note 94.
126

19

members of the Soviet block and their allies that opposed private property rights for ideological
reasons. Today, almost three decades later, most of these nations have amended their
constitutions and other laws to recognize the general right to property as part of their transition to
market economies. 134 China and Russia exemplify this transition, as can be seen by comparing
their current constitutions with those which were in place in 1986.
In 1986, the Constitution of China provided that the nation’s economic system was based
on “socialist public ownership of the means of production . . . .” 135 The constitution covered
only the property that was necessary for a citizen’s personal use: “The State protects the right of
citizens to own lawful earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property.” 136 In contrast,
the 2004 Constitution accepts the role of private property in the national economy, stressing that
the state will protect “the lawful rights and interests of the individual, private and other nonpublic sectors of the economy.” 137 Accordingly, it provides that “[t]he lawful private property of
citizens is inviolable” 138―without any limitation on the nature of that property. Moreover, it
imposes three new and distinct limitations on the power of the state to take private property.
Such a taking must be (1) “in the public interest,” (2) “in accordance with the law,” and (3)
compensation must be paid. 139
The Russian experience is similar. In 1986, the Constitution of the Soviet Union
provided that the “foundation of the economic system . . . is socialist ownership of the means of
production . . . .” 140 The constitution protected only “[p]ersonal ownership of citizens,” which
encompassed “[a]rticles of everyday use, of personal consumption and comfort, and of the
subsidiary household, a dwelling, and savings from labor.” 141 In contrast, the 2008 Constitution
of the Russian Federation endorses the “free flow of goods, services and financial resources,
support of competition, and the freedom of economic activity.” 142 Accordingly, “private, State,
municipal and other forms of property shall be recognized and protected on an equal basis.” 143 It
broadly provides that “[t]he right of private property shall be protected by law,” 144 without
limiting the type of property which is covered. The same provision restricts the right of the state
to take private property by imposing limits similar to those in the modern Constitution of China:
(1) such a taking must be for “State requirements”; (2) it must be done “under a court order”; and
(3) “prior and just compensation” must be paid. 145
3. Conclusion
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It is appropriate to recognize the right to property as a general principle of law at the
international level. Today the right is accepted as a core concept in the domestic legal system of
almost every nation. Moreover, because the international legal system has expanded over time to
regulate the relationship between state actors and non-state actors, it is necessary to enlarge the
corpus of international law by adopting principles which are appropriate to deal with these new
relationships. Over fifty years ago, Lord McNair suggested that general principles of law should
be utilized to regulate economic development agreements between nations and foreign investors,
noting that such arrangements “often involve the creation of rights which are not purely
contractual, but are more akin to rights of property . . . .” 146 Recognition of the global right to
property as a general principle will help to implement this vision.
D. Customary Law
It is generally agreed that customary international law imposes limitations on the right of
a state to expropriate the property of foreign nationals. 147 Indeed, disputes concerning the extent
of these limitations have generated a substantial body of international jurisprudence and
extensive scholarly analysis. 148
This section of the Article considers a broader question which has received little attention
to date: Does a general right to property exist as a matter of customary international law? This
question differs from the expropriation issue in two respects. First, it asks whether such a right
exists in both citizens and foreign nationals. Second, it addresses the right as a general matter,
not simply in the context of expropriation. Because customary international law applies to all
nations, this approach provides an alternative method of extending the global right to nations
which have not ratified one of the regional human rights treaties.
The conventional wisdom is that a global right to property is not customary international
law, as the 1987 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(“Restatement”) illustrates. The Reporter’s Note to Section 702 of the Restatement observes that
the Universal Declaration includes “the right to own and not to be arbitrarily deprived of
property.” 149 However, it then explains that disagreement as to the scope and content of that
right “weighs against the conclusion that a human right to property generally has become a
principle of customary law.” 150 But the next sentence seemingly contradicts this tentative
conclusion; it provides that “[a]ll states have accepted a limited core of rights to private
property, and violation of such rights, as state policy, may already be a violation of customary
law” (emphasis added). 151 Presumably, the reference to a “limited core of rights” reflects the
ideological tensions of the Cold War era. Even Soviet bloc nations acknowledged that an
individual had a right to the property necessary for personal use, such as clothes, tools, furniture,
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and the like. 152 In context, the note suggests that such a limited right might be customary law.
But it rejects the concept that a broad right to property is customary international law.
The enigmatic language of the Reporter’s Note masks a division among the drafters of
the Restatement. During a preliminary meeting in 1982, a member of the drafting committee
suggested that a general right to property should be included in the Restatement as customary
international law. 153 In the ensuing discussion, Professor Louis Henkin, the Chief Reporter,
commented that customary international law only recognized a right to property in the context of
the expropriation of property of foreign nationals, not a general right to property. 154 Reflecting
the international tensions of the era, he emphasized that only “those areas on which socialism
and capitalism agree” could be designated as customary law. 155 This would have extended
protection only to such individual property as was necessary for personal use, the only category
which was recognized by both the Soviet bloc and the West. Ultimately, a motion to add a broad
right to property in Section 702 as customary international law was defeated by a voice vote. 156
The irony in this saga is that Henkin apparently changed his mind on the issue thirteen
years later. During a 1995 symposium, he reportedly stated that “if he were drafting Section 702
today he would include as customary international law [the] right[] to property . . . .”157
However, he did not explain his rationale for this change in position. This section of the Article
will explain why Henkin’s 1995 conclusion was correct―a topic which scholars have not
previously addressed.
1. Custom as a Source of International Law
A principle of customary law arises when two elements are met: (a) states generally
adhere to a particular practice; and (b) they do so under the belief that this is required by
international law. 158 This second requirement is known as opinio juris sive necessitatis, usually
abbreviated as opinio juris.
The first element is satisfied if a clear majority of states customarily follow the practice,
even if it is not universally accepted. This custom may be evidenced by sources such as
domestic legislation, judicial decisions, and official government statements. 159 Although there is
scholarly disagreement about how widespread the practice must be, it is desirable to demonstrate
that it “is at least representative of the ‘main forms of civilization and of the principle legal
systems of the world.’” 160 This standard reflects both methodological and prudential constraints.
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It may be difficult to determine what the practices of 193 nations actually are. Moreover, if
customary international law could be established only when a practice was universally accepted,
only few such rules could be recognized because unanimous endorsement of any principle is
rare. 161 Once a principle is acknowledged to be customary international law, it is binding on all
states, whether or not they follow the custom.
The standards that govern the opinio juris element are more complex. As the
International Court of Justice noted in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, this element is met
when states “feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.” 162 In some
situations, the Court has seemingly assumed the existence of opinio juris where a widespread
state practice has been proven. 163 Yet other decisions of the Court appear to require affirmative
evidence that states have a subjective belief that the practice is obligatory. 164 This belief may be
deduced from multilateral treaties, United Nations resolutions, and other conduct by state
officials. 165
2. State Practice
The right to property easily satisfies the state practice requirement. As discussed above,
today almost every nation in the world recognizes the right of natural and legal persons to own
property, either through its national constitution or domestic legislation. 166
This modern uniform practice is the product of a remarkable global transformation which
began in the late 1980s. When Henkin and his colleagues debated whether the right to property
could be viewed as customary law in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union and its allies were still
largely hostile to private property for ideological reasons. Thus, at this time “socialism and
capitalism” could not agree that a global right to property should exist. Yet by 1995, when
Henkin changed his opinion on the question, this Cold War schism had largely ended: the Soviet
Union had dissolved; the newly reorganized Eastern European states had embraced market
economies; and even China was moving swiftly toward privatization. 167
3. Opinio Juris
The more difficult question is whether the opinio juris element is satisfied. Because the
state practice is almost universal, a tribunal might well utilize the less rigorous approach to the
element and assume that the practice reflects opinio juris without the need for proof of subjective
belief.
Under the more rigorous approach to opinio juris, a threshold question arises. Most
nations originally established the right to property as domestic law because it was seen as
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advantageous, not due to a subjective belief that it was mandated by international law. This
process occurred long before the post-World War II era, when the international community first
began to consider a global right to property. In addition, the former Soviet bloc nations which
adopted private property systems at the end of the Cold War seemingly did so because of the
economic and social benefits which these systems provide, rather than because they believed that
international law compelled this result. If a state initially adopts a particular practice such as the
right to property for domestic reasons, but later expresses its belief that the practice is required
by international law, does the practice become customary law? The answer to this question is
probably “yes.” 168 Regardless of why a state originally adopted the right to property, the
subjective element should be deemed satisfied once the state expresses its belief that the global
right is required by international law. In this situation, the state follows the practice for dual
reasons. It is both (a) advantageous to the state and (b) compelled by international law.
One source of opinio juris for the right to property is found in treaty law. In the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International Court of Justice acknowledged that “a very
widespread and representative” ratification of a multilateral treaty could provide evidence of
opinio juris. 169 As discussed above, about two-thirds of the world’s nations are parties to
regional human rights treaties which expressly recognize a binding right to property under
international law. This fact alone should be viewed as sufficient evidence of opinio juris. The
almost universal ratification of anti-discrimination conventions such as CEDAW, CERD, and
CRPD, which arguably recognize the right to property by implication, provides an independent
basis for satisfying the opinio juris element.
As the International Court of Justice observed in Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua, 170 opinio juris may also be “deduced from . . . the attitudes of . . . States
towards certain General Assembly resolutions.” 171 Some scholars have suggested that the
entirety of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights―presumably including the right to
property in Article 17― has evolved over time to become customary international law through
its periodic reaffirmation by the General Assembly and other international bodies, though this
remains a minority view. 172 At a minimum, however, the consistent endorsement of the
Universal Declaration by virtually all nations is evidence of opinio juris as to the right to
property and its other provisions. 173 As Brian Lepard summarizes, “the Universal Declaration
and other evidence point to a belief by states that they have a strong persuasive legal obligation
to protect all the rights it proclaims . . . .” 174
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A third source of opinio juris is found in General Assembly resolutions which
specifically endorse the right to property. In 1986, Resolution 41/132 expressed the view of 109
nations that “the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others, as
set forth in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . . is of particular
significance in fostering widespread enjoyment of other basic human rights.” 175 It is noteworthy
that no nations voted against this resolution, although many abstained. Four years later,
Resolution 45/98 both (a) repeated the theme that the right to own property contained in the
Universal Declaration and elsewhere was important in ensuring enjoyment of human rights and
(b) urged all states “to provide . . . adequate constitutional and legal provisions to protect the
right of everyone to own property . . . .” 176 This resolution was adopted by the General
Assembly without any opposition. 177
4. Conclusion
The analysis above supports the view that the right to property should be recognized as
customary international law. Because this right is almost universally found in domestic law, the
state practice element is easily satisfied. It is less clear that the opinio juris element is met. But
both treaties and U.N. resolutions provide compelling evidence that today the vast majority of
states accept the right as international law, even if many initially adopted the right for other
reasons. Accordingly, it is time to update the position taken by the Restatement, as Henkin
belatedly advocated, by acknowledging that the right to property is customary international law.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY
A. Content of the Right
Assuming that the global right to property does exist, the next question is how to define
the scope of that right. In other words, if X holds a right to property which is recognized as a
matter of international law, what is the content of that right?
Any attempt to answer that question in a meaningful fashion would go well beyond the
limited scope of this Article. The thesis of this Article is that the global right to property does
exist as a general matter. Thus, it is intended as the first step in a long and incremental process
of delineation. Extensive work by scholars, tribunals, international organizations, and others will
be necessary to develop and catalogue the components of the right, an endeavor which will
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necessarily take time.
acknowledged.

But this effort cannot begin until the existence of the right is first

With these caveats in mind, it is possible to sketch out four core aspects of the global
right to property. First, the right principally concerns the relationship between a natural or legal
person, on the one hand, and a government entity, on the other hand. 178 There is a welldeveloped body of human rights law governing the extent to which nations are required to
implement economic, social and cultural rights, which would logically apply to the right to
property either directly or by analogy. 179 Under this approach, the basic obligation is the duty of
the state to respect the right to property. 180 In most instances, the relevant government will be a
national government or one of its subdivisions, such as a provincial or city government.
However, the same principle might logically apply to the relationship between a person and an
intergovernmental organization, such as the United Nations.
Second, the right to property is a relative right, not an absolute one. By definition, the
scope of the right may be affected by cultural, social, and economic factors which may evolve
over time. 181 Interpreting the right to property in absolute terms could have harmful
consequences, such as blocking important land redistribution projects 182 or impairing the
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collection of taxes. 183 Ultimately, at a minimum, the right means that no one may be arbitrarily
deprived of her property, as Article 17 of the Universal Declaration reflects. As it develops, the
right will undoubtedly be broader than this core concept. But it will remain a relative right,
which may be counterbalanced by other societal needs. The logical starting point for this
analysis is Article 29 of the Universal Declaration, which provides that all human rights are
subject to “such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 184
Third, the property which is covered by the right is not limited to that which is vital for
individual or family life, such as a home, clothing, furniture, tools, or personal bank
accounts―as members of the former Soviet bloc had advocated―but rather encompasses all
forms of property. Early efforts to restrict the scope of Article 17 of the Universal Declaration to
family property were unsuccessful. 185 Accordingly, the right to property recognized in the
regional human rights conventions extends to property in general. 186 Similarly, the U.N. General
Assembly has indicated its belief that the right to property should extend to both “[p]ersonal
property, including the residence of one’s self and family” 187 and “[e]conomically productive
property, including property associated with agriculture, commerce and industry.” 188
Finally, the right should encompass both individual ownership and forms of communal or
joint ownership. This approach is consistent with Article 17 of the Universal Declaration which
specifies that it includes the right to own property “in association with others.” Although this
clause originally stemmed from Cold War tensions, today it provides a basis for respecting
traditional forms of customary or communal ownership which are often found in developing
countries, where rights are held by a tribe, clan, or other group. 189 The traditional Western focus
on individual property rights need not define the global right to property. Indeed, any such
attempt would be counterproductive to the goal of developing an international standard.
B. Practical Applications
The recognition of the global right to property would provide five types of benefits. The
magnitude of these benefits will increase exponentially as the contours of the right are delineated
with more precision.
First, recognition will ensure that the right is consistently respected and enforced in
international tribunals. The specialized tribunals which adjudicate disputes arising under the
regional human rights treaties, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter183
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American Court of Human Rights, routinely enforce this right. 190 Yet because the conventional
wisdom is that the global right to property does not exist as binding law, it has not been
uniformly respected in other international tribunals.
Second, a number of international instruments, ranging from treaties to contracts, provide
that “general principles” of international law or a similar standard should be used to resolve any
dispute which arises between the parties. 191 Recognition of the right to property as international
law will aid in interpreting the meaning of these provisions when disputes arise, whether or not
formal litigation occurs. In particular, consultation, conciliation, mediation, negotiation, and
other informal methods of dispute resolution are frequently used in the international arena. 192
Third, recognition of the right will contribute to building the framework for regulating
property in the global commons―areas which by definition are outside of the sovereign
jurisdiction of any nation such as the high seas, outer space, and Antarctica. 193 As a general
matter, it is both desirable and inevitable that a comprehensive legal regime be established to
govern the rights and duties of nations, intergovernmental organization, and private actors in
these regions. It is anomalous that the right to property would be routinely honored within the
territory of sovereign nations, as domestic laws almost universally provide, but not recognized in
the global commons. 194 The global right to property would help to fill that gap.
Fourth, the laws governing intergovernmental organizations will be clarified by
recognition of the right. 195 In this context, an intergovernmental organization is one (a) whose
members consist of nation states and (b) which performs quasi-governmental functions.196
Examples of such organizations range from the United Nations to the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Association to the International Criminal Court. By definition, intergovernmental
organizations are not subject to the jurisdiction of any nation. Accordingly, the legal standards
which govern their rights and duties are sometimes unclear. Most commonly, these are
established by specialized treaties. 197 But recognizing the right to property as a matter of
international law would help to fill some of the inevitable gaps and ambiguities found in such
treaties.
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Finally, the evolution of the global right to property may eventually help to harmonize
national property laws. While variation among the property laws of different nations is
inevitable, it may be possible to develop a global minimum standard for the right to property
which could encourage greater uniformity in national laws over time. Instruments such as the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 198 could provide a useful
model. Although the Convention establishes minimum standards for the scope of copyright
protection that all member nations must recognize in their domestic law, any member is free to
provide a greater level of protection. 199 The certainty provided by a global minimum standard
for property rights would encourage and facilitate international transactions.
C. Potential Conflicts of Law
A final issue is whether the global right to property would conflict with domestic legal
standards, whether found in formal laws or in customary tenure arrangements. While it is
foreseeable that such tensions could occur, this should not prevent the recognition of the global
right.
As demonstrated above, the domestic law of virtually every nation already recognizes the
right to property as a general matter, even if the specific content of the right may vary. 200 Thus,
in the short term, recognition of the global right in broad terms would be consistent with these
domestic laws. A bigger challenge could arise in the future as the content of the right is further
developed. The risk of conflict will presumably increase as the scope of the global right
becomes more specific.
One potential response is to develop the right as a global minimum standard which
consists of general principles. As discussed above, the value of this approach is that it
establishes a minimum floor of protection for the right, which allows a certain degree of
international uniformity but also permits national laws to vary in some respects. The history of
the European Court of Human Rights is instructive on this point. Although the domestic
property laws of its member nations differ somewhat, spanning civil law, common law, and
former socialist law systems, the court’s property law jurisprudence has established what might
be termed a regional minimum standard while also tolerating some national autonomy. 201
Customary or informal tenure arrangements may also cause concern. In parts of some
nations, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the formal legal system―including the
laws establishing a right to property―has limited relevance to the lives of many ordinary people.
Subsistence farmers in these regions often obtain an informal right to use communal land
through customary tenure systems, while formal title to the land is vested in the government or in
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absentee owners. 202 Similarly, in developing countries most dwellings on the outskirts of large
cities are built by squatters without permission from the landowner.
Yet the risk that a global right to property would unduly interfere with these informal
arrangements is probably more theoretical than real. The scope of the global right should be
broad enough to protect these land users―and perhaps more beneficial than formal domestic
property law. International law increasingly recognizes that indigenous and tribal peoples have a
right to ownership of the lands that their ancestors have historically used, regardless of how
formal title is held. 203 Moreover, a growing body of international law provides that residents
have a right to avoid being evicted from their homes and farms without good cause, even if they
do not hold formal title. 204 Finally, as noted above, the global right would protect both
individual and communal forms of ownership.
CONCLUSION
The time has come to recognize that a right to property exists under international law. In
recent decades, this body of law has expanded well beyond its historic function of governing
relations among state actors to the point where it increasingly addresses the relationships
between states and their citizens, as evidenced by the growth of international human rights law.
Moreover, the ideological opposition to property rights has faded away as formerly socialist
states and developing nations have embraced free-market economies. Just as the right to
property is a basic principle in the domestic law of virtually every nation, it should be viewed as
a fundamental right under international law.
The evolution of the right to property under the European Convention provides a helpful
template for development of the global right. When the right was incorporated into the
Convention in 1954, it consisted of only three sentences. The basic right was recognized in the
first sentence: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions.” The two ensuing sentences provided limited guidance as to the scope of the right.
Since that time, the European Court of Human Rights has decided hundreds of cases which have
defined the scope of that right. 205 In addition, the writings of many scholars have assisted in this
process. The right to property under the European Convention is now so thoroughly developed
that entire books have been devoted to the topic. 206
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The content of the global right to property will undoubtedly be the subject of extensive
debate in future decades. It is inevitable that future study will identify and delineate the core
concepts which are encompassed within the right, dealing with topics such as the acquisition and
transfer of property among private actors 207 and the ability of the state to regulate or seize
property. Conventional law may be helpful to some extent in developing these core concepts.
Indeed, it might be possible to craft a universally-accepted treaty which provides a blueprint for
the scope of the right. 208 But the more promising tools for this purpose are general principles of
law and customary international law, supplemented by decisions of judicial and arbitral tribunals
and the writings of scholars. Ultimately, the result will be a cohesive and coherent body of
international law which ensures that citizens of all nations will be able to fully enjoy this
fundamental right.
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